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Abstract. Despite existing methodologies in the field, most requirements 
engineers are poorly trained to define  security requirements. This is due to a 
considerable lack of security knowledge. Some security ontologies have been 
proposed, but a gap still exists between the two fields of security requirement 
engineering and ontologies. This paper is a survey, it proposes an analysis and a 
typology of existing security ontologies and their use for requirements 
definition.   
Keywords: Security, Ontologies, Security Requirements, Analysis, 
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1   Introduction 
Security of Information Systems (IS) has progressively become a very broad research 
field. It is no longer limited to classical virus attacks. Information assurance, security, 
and privacy have moved from being considered by IS designers as technical topics of 
interest to become critical issues [1].  Recall that security is defined as a discipline [2] 
which allows one to build reliable systems that can face malice, errors or mischief [3]. 
The British Standards Institution defined it as the protection of assets from a wide 
range of threats [4] which are of various origins: accidental or intentional, natural, 
human or technical [5]. The domain of IS security also encompasses a set of methods, 
techniques and tools responsible for protecting the resources of an IS to ensure 
information availability, confidentiality, integrity, and traceability.  Elahi [6] provides 
a set of concepts that security includes: an attacker performs intentional actions 
without justification to break a system by exploiting a vulnerability. A vulnerability 
(flaw) is considered as a property of the system or environment which, in conjunction 
with an attack, can lead to a safety failure. An asset is defined as something valuable 
in an organization. Assets are subject to attacks. Risk is characterized by the equation:  
 
Risk = threat * vulnerability / countermeasure.  
 
 The countermeasures are sets of actions implemented in prevention of the threat. 
A requirement prescribes a property judged necessary for the system; security 
requirements engineering frameworks derive security requirements using  security-
specific concepts, borrowed from security engineering paradigm.  With the growing 
need to implement IT security measures in world-wide corporate environments and 
the growing application scope, a major obstacle, that face ordinary analysts and 
developers using  existing security requirements modeling and analyzing  
frameworks, is the lack of security  knowledge and expertise.  It becomes also 
increasingly difficult for them to understand each other due to a non precisely defined 
terminology. Problems occur if an Asian employee is drafting a corporate-wide 
security policy, while his colleague in Russia is misinterpreting the policy, since the 
terms which were used are not explicitly defined. Some kind of agreed ontology can 
be used to avoid such inefficiencies [7]. 
 
 An ontology, in the field of knowledge representation, is most often defined as “a 
representation of a conceptualization” [8]. A more detailed description of an ontology 
is that it is a formal representation of the entities and relationships which exist in 
some domain. It should also represent a shared conceptualization in order to meet any 
useful purpose [9]. Ontologies are useful for representing and interrelating many 
types of knowledge. In 2003, Marc Donner urged the necessity of having good 
security ontologies.  He argued that too much security terminology is vaguely 
defined, thus it becomes difficult to communicate between colleagues and, worse, 
confusing to deal with the people we try to serve : “What the field needs is an 
ontology – a set of descriptions of the most important concepts and the relationships 
among them... A great ontology will help us report incidents more effectively, share 
data and information across organizations, and discuss issues among ourselves” [10].  
The need for a security ontology has been also recognized by the research community 
in  [11].  
  
 Recent studies have shown that the lack of information security knowledge at the 
management level is one reason for inadequate or non-existing information security 
management strategies and that raising management information security awareness 
and knowledge level leads to more effective strategies. In 2006, the European 
Network and Information Security Agency (ENISIA) rated the establishment of 
unified information bases for information security risk management and the need for 
risk measurement methods as high priority issues [12].  
 
 Since the awareness about security knowledge has grown in the scientific 
community, many security ontologies have been proposed during the last decade.  But 
there are still many questions around these works: what are the different security 
ontologies available nowadays? Do they meet the requirements? Do they cover all or 
some security aspects? Which ontology can I choose as an analyst seeking for security 
knowledge for the definition of  IS requirements?  We faced these questions, and 
conclude that we definitely need a general survey of existing security ontologies. 
Because interest in using security ontologies in different fields of research has grown, 
analysts and researchers may find in this paper a road map, an overview of what 
exists in terms of security ontologies. 
 
 This work is part of a larger project aiming to improve security requirement 
definition using ontologies.  Our main objective in this paper is to review, analyze, 
select and classify security ontologies, as a scope study but with a particular interest 
in the field of security requirements engineering.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we explain the 
methodology used in the study, Section 3 includes the survey and classification, and 
Section 4 recalls related works. Finally, Section 5, the conclusion, raises future 
perspectives. 
 
2   Methodology of research  
To perform this survey, we relied on information retrieval and survey methodologies 
presented in  [13,14,15,16]. We started by gathering, as far as possible, any 
publication related to ontologies, requirements, security and its various aspects. The 
search was conducted inside the relevant and known sources of literature such as 
Google Scholar, ACM libraries, IEEE digital library etc.  About 50 papers were 
gathered. We performed a first read to get a general idea; 21 papers were discarded at 
this stage when they were found to be far away from our target objective. A second 
read was carried out for deeper understanding and analysis of concepts and relations 
between them.  Finally, a quality analysis lead us to classify them into different 
families, and we  defined a set of criteria allowing us to compare the approaches. The 
result of this  comparison is synthesized in Table 1. The table illustrates how each 
proposed ontology deals with security aspects and requirements. 
3   Synthesis and Classification 
It appears that some researchers intend to cover all security aspects and propose 
general ontologies while others tackle a specific aspect of security; they sometimes 
refer to previous security taxonomies. In another context, given the increased 
importance of the World Wide Web in many fields, while security plays a vital role in 
the success of the Semantic Web, the web community proposed some security related 
ontologies helping them to define security aspects of web resources and 
communication. Back to security analysis, some authors proposed related security 
ontologies by adapting risk analysis, we grouped them in a specific category. Others 
tried to develop security ontologies for requirements engineering studies, and later 
with the advancement of security requirements agent models (Secure i* [17], Secure 
Tropos [3,18]), related modeling ontologies were proposed describing the concepts 
and relationships used. In some cases the security ontologies belong simultaneously to 
two categories. For example, there are taxonomies for requirements [19], or web 
oriented and fairly generic [20]. In these cases, we assigned the ontology to the more 
dominant field of research. The result is composed of 8 families of security ontologies 
(Fig. 1), described as follows.  
  
Fig. 1. Classification of Security Ontologies into 8 families. 
3.1   Beginning security ontologies  
One of the earliest work (back in the nineties) about merging knowledge base and 
information system management at an early level of development was [21] who 
proposed a language called Telos for representing knowledge about information 
systems and illustrates how this language can be applied in developing knowledge 
bases about software. The knowledge base is divided into four sub-worlds (subject 
world, usage world, system world, development world). Mylopoulos et al. note that 
Telos users can develop models for the purpose of security specification.    
3.2. Security taxonomies 
A taxonomy is an ontology in the form of a hierarchy. Whereas ontologies can have 
any type of relationship between categories, in a taxonomy there can only be  
generalization hierarchies.  Taxonomies of security concepts are a common method 
for sharing security knowledge. There are some interesting taxonomies, which were 
used later for developing security ontologies: 
 
- [22] provide a detailed taxonomy that contains classes of faults, fault modes, 
classification of fault tolerance techniques, and verification approaches. In this 
taxonomy, the main threats to dependability and security are defined as failures, 
errors, and faults. Avizienis et al. [22] classify the main means to attain security and 
dependability attributes into fault prevention, fault tolerance, fault removal, and fault 
forecasting.  
 
- Landwehr et al. [23] were particularly interested in security flaws. Their 
taxonomy is based on three basic questions about each observed flaw: genesis (how 
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did it enter the system?), time of introduction (when did it enter the system?), and 
location (where in the system did it manifest?).  
3.3. General security ontologies  
By general ontologies we mean these ontologies which aim at covering all (or most) 
security aspects :  
 
- Herzog and colleagues [24] have proposed an OWL-based ontology of 
information security. They endeavored to deliver an extensible ontology for the 
information security domain that includes both general concepts and specific 
vocabulary of the domain, and supports machine reasoning and collaborative 
development. The proposed ontology is built around the following top-level concepts: 
assets, threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures. These general concepts together 
with their relations form the core ontology which presents an overview of the 
information security domain in a context-independent and application neutral manner. 
In order to be practically useful, the core ontology is populated with domain-specific 
and technical vocabulary which constitute the core concepts and implement the core 
relations. The ontology contains 88 threat classes, 79 asset classes, 133 
countermeasure classes, and 34 relations between these classes.  
   
- In the same vein, Fenz and Ekelhart [12] have proposed an ontology (500 
concepts) that has a similar goal but attempts to cover a broader spectrum: their 
ontology models a larger part of the information security domain, including non-core 
concepts such as the infrastructure of organizations. In the high level concepts of the 
ontology and their relations we find threat which gives rise to follow-up threats, 
represents a potential danger to organization's assets and affects specific security 
attributes (confidentiality, integrity, availability) as soon as it exploits a vulnerability 
in the form of a physical, technical, or administrative weakness, and it causes damage 
to certain assets.  
3.4. Specific security ontologies 
 This category gathers the specific domain security ontologies – the ones that describe 
specified aspects of security such as Session Initial Protocol vulnerabilities,  Intrusion 
detection, etc. 
 
- In [26], the authors propose a data model that characterizes the domain of 
computer attacks and intrusions as an ontology and implement that data model with 
an ontology representation language. At the topmost level of the ontology, they define 
the class Host. The System Component class is comprised of the subclasses (Network, 
System, Process). The class Attack is described by the properties Directed to, Effected 
by, and Resulting in. Accordingly, the classes System Component, Input, and 
Consequence are the corresponding objects. The class Consequence is comprised of 
several subclasses which include (Denial of Service, User Access, Probe). Finally, the 
class Input is characterized by the predicates Received from and Causing, where 
Causing defines the relationship between the Means of attack and some input. 
Received from links Input and Location. The class Location is an instance of System 
Component and is restricted to instances of the Network and Process classes. Means 
of attack contains the following subclasses: Input Validation Error, Logic Exploits. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Part of the ontology proposed by [26]. 
 
      - [27] analyzed thirteen different computational trust models and derived a common 
vocabulary for describing facts that are considered for trust calculation in the 
reviewed trust models. The models can be classified as identity-aware, action-aware, 
business value aware, capability-aware, competence-aware, confidence-aware, 
context-aware, history-aware and third-party-aware in their input factors. The trust 
ontology comprises many ontological structures; trust is a relationship between two 
principals, the subject, trustor, and the target, trustee.  
 
  - Voice over IP (VoIP) telephony services suffer from various types of attacks and 
vulnerabilities, mainly due to the utilization of an open environment, the Internet. 
Geneiatakis and Lambrinoudakis [28] propose an ontology for SIP-VoIP based 
services. This ontology can be applied either to find a countermeasure against attacks 
on SIP based VoIP services or for testing the security robustness of SIP-VoIP 
(Session Initial Protocol-VoIP) infrastructure. The ontology contains two main 
concepts SIP_attack and SIP_message. Specifically any SIP attack employs a SIP 
message that is forwarded to a target node trying to cause a specific consequence. The 
SIP_attack is directed by a target and causes a consequence.  It has two subclasses: 
malformed and flood. 
3.5. Web oriented security ontologies  
Some works addressed both the security community and the semantic web 
community.  
 
  - Denker et al in [30], [31], [32] develop several ontologies for security annotations 
of agents and web services, using DAML (DARPA Agent Markup Language) and 
later OWL (Web Ontology Language).  The defined ontology is composed of two 
sub-ontologies: “security mechanisms” which capture high-level security notations 
and “credential” which defines authentication methods. The goal of these ontologies 
is to enable high-level markup of Web resources, services, and agents while providing 
a layer of abstraction on top of various web service security standards.  These 
ontologies represent well-known security concepts and enable their users to 
interconnect security standards. 
 
  - The NRL Security Ontology proposed in [20] is organised around seven separate 
ontologies (Main Security Ontology, Credential Ontology, Security Algorithms 
Ontology, Security Assurance Ontology, Service Security Ontology, Agent Security 
Ontology, Information Object Ontology).  Three of them are based on existing based 
ontologies in DAML: firstly, “Service security ontology”, which describes security 
annotation of semantic web services; secondly, “Agent security ontology”, which 
enables querying of security information; and finally “Information object ontology”, 
which describes security of input and output parameters of web services.  The four 
remaining ontologies are as follows: “Main security ontology”, describes security 
protocols, mechanisms and policies; “Credentials ontology”, specifies authentication 
credentials; “Security algorithms ontology”, describes various security algorithms; 
and “Security assurance ontology”, specifies different assurance standards. 
 
 - Artem Vorobiev and Jun Han proposed a security attack ontology for Web service 
[33]. The ontology brings together a set of attacks (attacks on Web services, probing 
attacks, CDATA Field attacks, WS DoS attacks, WS DoS attacks, Application attacks, 
SOAP attacks, XML attacks, semantic WS attacks). 
3.6. Risk based security ontologies  
Recent trends in security methodologies tends to consider that the best approach of 
security consists in starting from a risk analysis. It allows the experts to adapt the 
security solutions to the actual risk, leading to a more effective security plan.   
  
 -  [7] proposed a security ontology framework based on four parts: the first part is the 
security and dependability taxonomy from [22], the second part presents the 
underlying risk analysis methodology, the third part describes concepts of the IT 
infrastructure domain and the fourth part provides a simulation enabling enterprises to 
analyze various policy scenarios. The ontology ‘knows’ which threats endanger which 
assets and which countermeasures could lower the probability of occurrence, the 
potential loss or the speed of propagation for cascading failures.  
   - [29] proposed to develop a knowledge base containing ontologies for the analysis 
of industrial risks describing concepts used for the achievement of a risk analysis. 
3.7. (Security) Ontologies for Security requirements 
Some papers refer to ontologies in order to cope with the definition of security 
requirements:  
 
  - Dobson and Sawyer [9] propose an ontology of dependability by merging two 
conceptualisation models (IFIP model: proposed by the IFIP Working Group 10.4 on 
Dependable Computing and Fault Tolerance & UMD model: Unified Model of 
Dependability).  Some of the IFIP attributes are themselves goals of security 
(Availability, Integrity, Maintainability, and Confidentiality).  The ontology covers 
some security aspects such as Failure, Dependability Threat (Error, Fault), 
Dependability Attributes (Availability, Integrity, Confidentiality…) 
 
  - Tsoumas et al. [34] define a security ontology using OWL and propose the security 
framework of an arbitrary information system which provides security acquisition and  
knowledge  management. Tsoumas et al. have used Asset, Stakeholder, Vulnerability, 
Countermeasure and Threat concepts in the construction of the security ontology. The 
security ontology acts as a container for the IS security requirements (“What” part). 
 
  - In [35], the authors use OWL to propose a security ontology with which to develop 
secure applications. The proposed ontology is formed of “assets” (data asset, 
hardware data,...), “countermeasures” (identification and authentication, network 
management, auditing services, physical protection,...), “objectives”, “persons” 
(insider stakeholder, attacker,...) and “threats” (errors, attacks, technical failures,...). 
They validate the defined ontology using nRQL queries in order to demonstrate that 
their ontology can be used in various contexts. They apply it to e-government 
scenarios: e-tax and e-voting. 
 
  - Firesmith [19] presents a taxonomy of safety-related requirements: “Safety 
requirements” are requirements obtained from threats analysis. “Safety-significant 
requirements” includes non-safety requirements that can cause hazards and safety 
incidents. “Safety constraints” are constraints that directly impact safety and are 
derived from laws, policies, standards, and industrial practices. “Safety system 
requirements” specify aspects of the primary system. 
3.8. Security modelling ontologies  
Even if authors present them as ontologies, they mainly describe metamodels. They 
are very close to being a metamodel of security models. While the previous 
ontologies include security specific concepts such as threat, attack, vulnerability .., 
these ontologies include security related concepts for modelling requirements and the 
dependencies between them such as relationship, proposition, situation .. 
    
  - In [36], first, the concept of  security constraint is introduced, as a separate 
concept, next to the existing concepts of Tropos. Secondly, existing concepts such as 
goals, tasks, resources, are defined with and without security in mind. For example a 
goal should be differentiated from a secure goal, the latter representing a goal that 
affects the security of the system. Thirdly, security-engineering concepts such as 
security features, protection objectives, security mechanisms and threats, which are 
widely used in security engineering, are introduced in the Tropos ontology, in order to 
make the methodology applicable by software engineers as well as security engineers.  
 
  - Massacci et al. [37] propose an extended ontology for security requirements.  The 
very top of the taxonomy is adapted from DOLCE, a foundational ontology intended 
to account for basic concepts that underlie natural language and human cognition. 
Lower levels of the taxonomy include concepts from i*, problem frames and 
argumentation frameworks, with security concepts occupying the lowest strata of the 
taxonomy. Let's list some of their proposed concepts: Objects (Proposition, Situation, 
Entity, Relationship) – Entities (Actor, Action, Process, Resources, Assets) – 
Relationships (do-dependency, can-dependency, trust-dependency) from SI* – 
Propositions (Fact, Claim, Argument, Domain-Assumption, Quality Proposition, 
Goal).  
Thus many papers propose security ontologies composed of different but related 
concepts aiming at common or different objectives. The following section compares 
and evaluate them.  
3 Discussion and evaluation 
In this section, we compare security ontologies and try to evaluate to which extent 
they cover security requirements and thus can be used in requirement engineering.  
 
[21] did not literally propose a security ontology nor an ontology, but a basic 
taxonomy composed of four sub-worlds. The authors note that users of Telos (the 
proposed language for developing the knowledge base and the sub-worlds) have 
developed models for the purpose of security specification but did not detail the 
underlying models. 
 
  In the family of security taxonomies, [22] proposed a detailed taxonomy of security 
and dependability. But this taxonomy fails to cover techniques for protecting 
confidentiality, establishing authenticity, analysing issues of trust and the allied topic 
of risk management.  Some important security elements are not addressed, such as 
vulnerabilities and assets. The taxonomy doesn't deal with any use for requirements.   
 
 The main limit in the taxonomy of [23] is that it is too basic, focused on some flaws 
in operating systems only, far from many kinds of security flaws that might occur in 
application programs for database management, word processing, electronic mail, and 
so on. The study needs to be updated with recent work. Flaws in networks and 
applications are becoming increasingly important, and the distribution of flaws among 
the categories they have defined may not be stationary. The taxonomy of [23] focused 
on a special kind of threats and does not address any countermeasure or related 
vulnerability.  
  
  The two general security ontologies [24] and [12] are both interesting contributions 
but neither of them is complete. While the first one seems simple and clearer, the 
second is much richer but more complex. Fenz et al. cover better asset concepts, while 
Herzog et al. cover threat concepts better. Fenz's main contribution consist of the 
organisation concepts, clearly absent from Herzog. Herzog's countermeasures tend to 
be technical whereas Fenz's are both business and technical. The advantage of these 
ontologies of being generic and capturing most security aspects leads also to 
drawbacks since they lack in specificity that the specific security domain ontologies 
[26], [27], [28] provide, and vice-versa.  Neither [24] nor [12] ontologies were used 
for requirements definition and analysis, but both, combined with the specific 
ontologies, can be a very good source of security knowledge for requirements. The 
general ontologies offer generic concepts of security objectives, assets, 
vulnerabilities, countermeasures, threats... while the rest offers more specific threats 
concepts (computer attacks and intrusions in [26], for example). 
 
  The security ontologies developed in the semantic web area are not negligible.  The 
ontology of [20] looks like a generic security ontology from a first sight with its seven 
sub-ontologies. However it does not cover some aspects like vulnerabilities and assets 
or organisation, or even threats. Nevertheless, in a web sharing community, where 
both resource requestors and providers have security requirements, [20] proposed a 
matching algorithm that facilitates mapping of higher level (mission-level) security 
requirements to lower-level (resource level) capabilities using the ontology.  In a very 
similar previous work by Denker et al. [30][31][32], the proposed ontology fails to 
consider vulnerabilities, assets and threats; but a reasoning engine matches between 
the request requirements and the capabilities of the potential web service whose 
requirements need to be satisfied by the capabilities specified in the request.      
 
  The risk based security ontologies we found in [7] and [29] could be useful for a risk 
based requirement analysis like [38] or [39]. However, to the best of our knowledge, 
there were no propositions combining both sides.    
 
  In the context of requirements engineering some ontologies were proposed, but 
unfortunately none of them is associated to a methodology describing how to use 
them for requirement definition. Dobson and Sawyer's ontology [9] concentrates on 
few threat concepts, and neglects many other aspects of security. Tsoumas et al [34], 
in addition to their ontology, provided a framework, but don't indicate any detailed 
mechanism on how to use the ontology for requirement collection.  The main lack of 
Karyda et al. [35] is the absence of vulnerability related concepts, although they 
propose many examples of queries on the ontology, that provide answers to the 
developer in an e-government application.  
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Finally, the security modelling ontologies, which are more security modelling 
oriented (relationship, entity...) than security concept oriented (assets, threats, ...) 
might be useful for constructing security requirements models like Secure i* and 
Tropos.  A limitation common to all the ontologies we have been facing is that they 
are described in papers but are not available on the Internet, which makes their use 
difficult.   
 
  We summarise this analysis and evaluation in Table 1. The rows are the families of 
security ontologies. The columns list the aspects related to security (objectives, assets, 
vulnerabilities, threats, countermeasures and organisation).  The last column in the 
table evaluates the link between the ontology and requirements definition. A black dot 
measures to which extent does the security ontology cover this specific aspect of 
security, and how does this particular security ontology deals with requirements. We 
used a dash for absence of use and a black square to indicate that technical aspects of 
security were addressed, as follows:  How does the ontology cover this concept of 
security? How does this security ontology proposal deal with requirements (last 
column)?     
 
-: absent  ●: very few  ●●: few  ●●●: much   ●●●●: very much   ڦ: Technical 
 
 To complete the study we drew up a graph that represent roughly, for each security 
ontology, how much it deals with requirements (axis of abscissa) and how much it 
covers security concepts (axis of ordinates). The graph in Figure 3 clearly reveals a 
gap between the two  fields. There is not a perfect ontology that covers lots of security 
aspects and, at the same time that can be used in the definition for security 
requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Using security ontologies for requirement definition 
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4  Related works  
 While many security ontologies have been proposed, few surveys have been 
attempted. The only ones we can cite here are [1], [6] and recently [40]. [6] was not 
primarily about ontologies, but she mentioned some security ontologies and 
taxonomies in her state of art of security requirements. [40] proposed a survey of 
general ontologies for information systems encompassing some few security 
ontologies. Blanco et al. [1] is an interesting review and comparison of security 
ontologies that helped us in our study. However, since 2009 other ontologies have 
been proposed, indicating a need for updating.  Moreover, Blanco et al. organized the 
existing ontologies under four categories (general security ontologies, applied to a 
specific domain, theoretical works, semantic web-oriented). Our aim was to extend 
this classification to additional categories and to update their surveys with recent 
literature contributions. 
5 Conclusion and perspectives  
 Let us come back to our main question: which security ontology for my 
requirements?  This study has shown the existence of  considerable work around 
security ontologies; several ontologies have been proposed. We classified them into 
eight families (theoretical basis, security taxonomies, general, specific, risk based, 
web oriented, requirements related, modelling). This classification extends the 
previous works which were limited to two, three, or four families at best.    
 Our analysis has also shown that the existing security ontologies vary a lot in the way 
they cover security aspects; we tried to analyse how each ontology covers each aspect 
of security (objectives, assets, vulnerabilities, threats, countermeasures, and 
organisation). Moreover, we studied whether the proposed security ontology can be 
used for requirements  definition and the degree of this use.  
    
The study revealed a real gap between the fields of security requirement 
engineering and ontologies, and thus a new area of research to explore.  
 
  We believe that this work can be improved; the classification needs to be 
extended. We need sub-categories for each family of security ontologies.  We also 
believe that there are still important issues to be addressed in the adaptation of 
ontology-based requirements engineering techniques to security requirements 
Engineering.  This paper allows us to assert that the challenges facing software 
security is the lack of an easily accessible large common body of security knowledge. 
Although much security ontologies are available, they all fall short in completeness  
and suitable granularity. It also remains difficult for designers to extract relevant 
pieces of knowledge to apply to their specific design or requirements related decision 
making situations.  
Our objective for the next steps of the project is to explore the techniques and 
mechanisms for the best use of these security ontologies for security requirement 
definition. 
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Table 1.  Summary of security ontologies of the study 
 
 
1 How does the ontology cover this concept of security ?                                               - : absent  ●: very few    ●●: few  ●●●: much     ●●●●: very much ڦ: Technical 
2 How does this security ontology deal with requirements (last column)  
Family Security ontology1  Security Objective1 Assets1 Vulnerabilities1 Threats1  Counter-
measures1 
Organisation1 Requirements2
 
Beginning [21] - 
 
- - - - ● ● 
[22] ●●● - - ●● ●●●● - - Security 
Taxonomies  [23] - - - ●●●●ڦ - - - 
[24] ●● ●●●ڦ ●● ●●●ڦ ●●●ڦ ●● -  
General [12] ●●●● ●● ●●●● ●●●● ●●●● ●●●● - 
[26] 
 
- ●ڦ ●ڦ ●●ڦ - - - 
[27] 
 
● - - - - - - 
Specific  
[28] ●● - - ●●●ڦ - - - 
Risk based [7] 
 
●● - - ●●●● ڦ ●●● ●●● - 
[30] [31] [32]   
●●● 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
●●ڦ 
 
- 
 
●● 
[20] 
 
●●●● - - - ●●●ڦ - ●● 
Web oriented  
[33]   
 
- - - ●●●●ڦ - - - 
[9] ●● - - ●● - - - 
[34] - ●●● ●●● ●● ●●● ● ● 
[35] ●● ●●● - ●●● ● ●● ● 
For security 
requirements  
 
 
[19] - ●  -  ● -  -  ●● 
[36] ● - - - - ● ●●● Modelling  
 
 
[37] ●● ●● - ● - - ●●● 
